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Nor has it been forgotten that it was one of the attributes of
sovereignty, the taxing power of the state, which was to be
passed upon. It is conceded that this prerogative is not only
imperial in its character, but is absolutely necessary to the public
welfare, and that a right at once so elevated and so essential, is
not to be diminished or impaired jn the slightest degree, even on
constitutional considerations, except on the surest grounds. But
it is also to be remembered, that even more valuable than the
revenues of a state are those fundamental restrictions which pre-
vent each member of this confederacy from the exercise of those
powers, which in the grand scheme of our national polity have
been prohibited. And being entirely satisfied, from the reasons
above stated, that the legislative act now before this court, in
imposing the tax in controversy, infringes one of those restric-
tions, it seems to me that so far as its operation in this particular
is concerned, it should, without hesitation, be declared by this
court to be void.
In my opinion, the judgment of the Supreme Court should be
reversed.
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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK. 1
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA.
2
SUPREME COURT Or VERMONT.
3
ACTION.
Parol Evidence as to former Suit.-Where only a single cause of
action, viz., assumpsit for the breach of a warranty, was set forth in the
complaint in a former suit before a justice of the peace: Held, that the
record of the judgment in that suit imported a judgment'upon that cause
of action ; and that in a subsequent suit between the same parties, in the
Supreme Court, it was erroneous to receive parol evidence to show the
proofs and proceedings in the former suit, and that the judgment therein
1 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in Vol. 42 of his Reports.
2From R. E. Wright., Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. 11 of his Reports.
3 We are indebted for these abstracts to J. A. Wing, Esq., of Montpelier. The
cases were decided in November, 1864, and the volume of Reports in which they
will appear cannot yet be indicated.
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was in fact rendered upon proof of a different cause of action than that
stated in the complaint, to wit, fraud in the sale of property: Royce vs.
Burt, 42 Barb.
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENCE.
Sufficiency of-.Action on Foreign Judgment.-Judgment for want of
a sufficient affidavit of defence may be taken in an action of debt in
Pennsylvania upon a judgment obtained in the Supreme Court of New
York: Luchenbach vs. Anderson, 11 Wright.
An affidavit df defence to such an action, which alleged that the de-
fendant was fraudulently decoyed to the state in which he was sued, for
the purpose of obtaining a service of the process upon him, but nothing
against the debt for which the action was brought, is insufficient: Id.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.
Title of Purchaser from Assignee.-Though an assignment for the
benefit of creditors be fraudulent, as against the creditors of the assignor,
that will not affect the title of a purchaser from the assignees, if he is
not connected with the fraud, and is in fact a purchaser in good faith,
and for a valuable consideration, and without notice of the fraud: Shld-
don vs. Stryker, 42 Barb.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE.
Lien of.-This was an action of trover against an officer for attaching
certain property claimed by plaintiff. A debtor of the plaintiff, while
the plaintiff was living in New Hampshire, where the debtor then lived,
gave the plaintiff a chattel-mortgage of the property in suit, which was
valid by the laws of New Hampshire, without change of possession. The
debtor then brought the property into Vermont with the consent of plain-
tiff, and kept it and used it for some months, having the exclusive pos-
session of the same, when it was attached by the defendant as an officer
on a debt due in Vermont. Held, that the plaintiff's lien by virtue of
his chattel-mortgage being good by the laws of New Hampshire, where
the defendant then lived, it was equally valid in Vermont, and the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover: Cobb vs. Buswell, Sup. Ct. Vermont.
CONTRACT.
Action by Stranqer to-Evidence.-Where, upon the completion of a
contract for hauling bark, the balance due the contractor was, at his
request, placed to the credit of a third person, the latter cannot main-
tain an action for the amount credited in his own name, for he is a
stranger to the contract and consideration : Robertson & Co. vs. Reed,
11 Wright.
But, as the defect would be amendable, it is not a ground for reversal
of the judgment: Id.
In the action to recover the amount of the credit, evidence was
admissible that part of the bark claimed to have been hauled, and for
which credit was given, had been burned instead, with the knowledge,
if not privity, of the contractor before the settlement; that in conse-
quence nothing was due him by the firm with whom he had contracted,
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andi that the credit was taken on their books from the account of the
plaintiff, who afterwards settled it and received the balance without
objection : Id.
CORPORATION.
Interest on Corporate Loans- Where Payable.-Where the loans of a
corporation are payable at a fixed place and time, the interest thereon
ceases at that time, whether the bond or evidence of indebtedness be
presented or not ; it is not necessary, to escape after-accruing interest,
that the amount of the loan, with accumulated interest, at the time of
payment, be kept separate from the other funds of the company, if it
can be shown that funds sufficient for payment were at all times in hand:
Emlen vs. Lehigh Co., 11 Wright.
DEPOSITIONS.
Depositions before a doffcrent Person from the one named in the No-
tice to the opposite Party.-The defendant cited plaintiff to appear.before
Judge Brockway, at a place named in Kansas, to be present at the taking
of the deposition of one Blush, before said Brockway. But the defend-
ant took said deposition before another magistrate, at the time and place
named in said citation. The court below admitted the deposition. .eld,
that the defendant having notified the plaintiff to appear before a certain
magistrate, could not take the deposition before any other magistrate,
and the admission of the deposition was an error. Whether it was
necessary to name the person in all cases before whom the deposition is
to be taken the court left undecided: Henry vs. .untley, Sup. Ct.
Vermont.
EVIDENCE.
Declarations of Deceased Persons as to Boundaries.-When a person
that bad the means of knowledge as to ancient boundaries, who is now
deceased and had no interest in making the declarations, had, when near
the line, pointed out the line or any marks or monuments showing where
the same was, his declaration may be given in evidence to establish said
lines. And what a tenant in possession of lands, after he has parted with
his title and has no interest in the matter, says when near the line, as to
where the line is, may after his decease be given in evidence: Wood et
al. vs. Willard et al., Sup. Ct. Vermont.
This hearsay evidence was first confined in England to the bounda-
ries of municipal corporations, but in America we extend it to private
individuals. In Massachusetts and Connecticut it is law that when 3
person had knowledge and pointed out the boundaries when near the
same, and is dead, and had no interest in the line at the time, his decla-
rations can be given in evidence: Id.
- Certificate of .Icknowledgment.-Assignments of property, bills of
sale, or agreements, may be admitted in evidence, on the acknowledg-
ment and proof thereof before a commissioner of deeds, accompanied by
the certificate of the county clerk of the commissioner's appointment and
authority to act as such: Sheldon vs. Stryker, 42 Barb.
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If a certificate of the acknowledgment of an instrument by a sub-
scribing witness states that the witness is known to the officer, that is
a substantial compliance with the law. It is not necessary that the pre-
cise language of the statute should be used: Id.
To render an instrument, properly acknowledged, admissible in evi-
dence, it is not necessary that the acknowledgment or proof should be
taken before the commencement of the action. It is sufficient if the
certificate of the officer be indorsed on the instrument when it is offered
in evidence: Id.
EXECUTION.
Stay-law-- When Unconstitutional.-The proviso to section first of
Act 21st May, 1861, granting a stay of execution on a judgment due
by a soldier, notwithstanding a waiver, is unconstitutional: Lewis vs.
Lewis et al., 11 Wright.
Where a judgment-note contained a waiver of stay of execution, and
when due an attachment in execution was issued thereon, it was error to
stay the writ on the ground that the defendant was at the time a soldier
in military service: Id.
EXECUTOR.
Liability of Commissions to Attachment.-The commissions of an
executor are not attachable at the suit of his judgment-creditors, in his
own hands or those of his co-executors : Adams's Appeal, Malon Hutc h
inson's Estate, 11 Wright.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Judgment of Married Woman.-A judgment given by a married
woman for a debt contracted for the improvement of her real estate, is
void in Pennsylvania: Bruner's Appeal, 11 Wright.
But a wife may agree to revive a judgment which was entered on a
bond executed by her before marriage: d.
Acts of 1848 and 1849, relative to Married Women-Creditors of
Tfe.-The New York Acts of 1848 and 1849, for the more effectual pro-
tection of the property of married women, are remedial statutes, and
must receive a liberal and b.eneficent construction, so as to give effect to
the intention of the legislature, notwithstanding some of the results may
seem to proceed beyond the letter of the acts: Goss vs. Cahill and
Wife et aL, 42 Barb.
The manifest intention was to enable married women to take, hold, and
use and enjoy real and personal property obtained in the way prescribed
in the statute, and also to grant, devise, and convey the same, to the
same extent, and with the like effect, as if they were sole and unmar-
ried : Id
Incidental to the right of property and the power of disposition, is
the power to improve it and increase its value. A like incident to the
use of real property is the right to the increased value, whether it pr-
ceeds from improvements put upon it by the owner, or from a rise i*
value : li.
A married woman, who borrows money upon the separate estate, makes
valuable improvements upon it, and thus enhances its value beyond the
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
cost of the expenditure, does not derive the enhanced value by any of
the methods mentioned in the statute, but takes it as an incident, and
as a part of the property itself: .d.
Such improvement and enhanced value, although it be deemed to be
the fruits and results of the wife's skill and labor, ought not to enure to
the benefit of the husband and his creditors, for the reason that the im-
provements are blended with and have become a part of the property
itself, and no new property has been created or acquired. The residue,
or the eqvivalent in money, has been enlarged, but the lands-the pro-
perty-is still the same: .d.
A husband and wife being in destitute circumstances, the wife pur-
chased land, borrowed money, and built upon it, managed it with skill
and good fortune, without the interference or assistance of her husband,
and all the value it had, over and above the incumbrances, was due to
her good management, and the rise in the value of land in that vicinity,
together with the use of her real and personal property. Held, that
there was no measure by which the value of the wife's services could be
separated and estimated, and therefore they did not constitute property
as to which the husband, or his creditors, could have any legal or equi-
table rights: Id.
INSURANCE.
Capture by Rebel Cruiser.-The capture by a privateer in commission
under the government of the so-called Confederate States, of an insured
vessel, does not render the insurers liable upon the policy, where liability
for "loss by seizure, capture, or detention, or the consequences of any
attempt thereat," was excepted therein: Fifield vs. The Ins. Co. of
Penna., 11 Wright.
JUDGMENT.
Against Partners-Lien-Notce.-Where the Christian names of the
partners of a firm, who had given a judgment signed with the firm's
name, were not set out upon the judgment-docket on entry of the judg-
ment, it is without effect as a lien against subsequent purchasers or lien
creditors without notice: Smith's Appeal, 11 Wright.
Actual notice of the judgment would have supplied the defective or
omitted index of the registry: but to be actual notice the subsequent
ineumbrancer must be personally informed of the specific prior lien be-
fore his right as a lien-creditor attach; notice to his counsel is not suffi-
cient: Id.
MORTGAGE.
Fraudulent Intent-Right ofDebtor to prefer Creditors.-To avoid a
mortgage on account of a fraudulent intent on the part of the mortgagor
to hinder and delay his creditors, a fraudulent intent on the part of the
mortgagee, also, must be shown. It is not enough to show that the
zioftgagor made it with the purpose of hindering and delaying his cre-
ditors; but the mortgagee must have participated in that purpose, and
received the mortgage with that intent: Carpenter vs. Muren et al., 42i
Barb.
Including in a mortgage debts due, or alleged to be due, to others,
(the mortgagee, at the same time giving his parol undertaking to pay
those debts, will not of itself make the mortgage fraudulentper se. In
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connection with other circumstances, that fact might be some evidence
of a fraudulent inteution, but nothing more: id.
So, including in a mortgage a debt to become due from the mortgagor
at a future day, is not a fraudulent act in itself: Id.
When a creditor has two debts, one already due and payable, and
the other payable at a distant day, he may take security for the payment
of both, from his debtor in failing circumstances, without the inference
or imputation of fraud: Id.
A debtor in failing circumstances has a perfect right to prefer one of
his creditors to another, in the disposition of his estate. And a diligent
creditor who secures his claim by legal proceedings, or by a voluntary
arrangement with his debtor, is entitled to enjoy all the benefits of his
superior activity and diligence: Id.
NEGLIGENCE.
Blowing Whistle on Railroad Train.-The plaintiff, with four horses'
for market, had crossed the railroad track and was passing along on the
road parallel with the railroad, when he met a freight train. -The engi-
neer saw the horses, when he was about to blow the whistle, about ninety
rods from the crossing, and seeing they appeared frightened and fearing
that if he blewthe whistle it would increase the fright of the horses, in
good faith refrained from blowing the whistle. Two of the horses broke
away from plaintiff, and ran towards the crossing; they reached the
crossing and struck against the sixth car from the engine and were
injured. The jury found that the injury was caused by the defendants
not blowing the whistle or ringing the bells as required by law. Held,
that there might be cases that would excuse the company from comply-
ing with the statute; that if the engineer acted in good faith, that alone
was not sufficient to discharge the company from liability. It was a
question of fact for the jury, taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances in the case: Wakefield vs. Conn. & Pass. R. R. Co., Sup.
Ct., Vermont.
NEw TRIAL.
Grantable by Supreme Cour.-This court has authority to grant a new
trial when the court are clearly satisfied that the verdict is against the
weight of evidence. But it should be a clear case. The proper tribu-
nal is the county court, who have heard the witnesses and can better
judge in the premises: Nortifeld Bank vs. Brown, Sup. Ct., Vermont.
Cumulative Evidence-Laches.-A new trial will not be granted, on
the ground of newly-discovered evidence, where the evidence would be
cumulative in its nature; or where a party has been guilty of laches in
making his motion; or after judgment has been entered: Sheldon vs.
Stryker, 42 Barb. -
Quo WARRANTO.
Against Borough Offlcers.-A bill in equity for an injunction to re-
strain borough officers from entering upon official duties under an alleged
illegal appointment of town councils, will not lie, though they had not
exercised or attempted to exercise the duties of their offices; the remedy
is at law by guo warranto and to be invoked after entry into or exer-
cise of authority under their appointments: Updegraphl et al. vs. Cra s,
11 Wright.
